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claims more quickly. Secondly, proceedings on motion allow the court
to definitely retain jurisdiction over the parties.248
It is suggested that the above recommendations would result in a
more effective and clearer procedure of attacking judgments. Consoli-
dation especially would have an advantageous effect. It would benefit
both judgment holders and applicants in clarifying the law. Consolida-
tion would restrict ill-defined causes of action, thereby protecting finality,
and would afford clear relief to claimants who have set out meritorious
causes.
THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN INDIANA: AN
EVALUATION OF PRESENT STANDARDS
A motion for a directed verdict, properly viewed, tests the legal suf-
ficiency of the evidence to sustain each of the ultimate propositions
which collectively constitute the cause of action or defense that the pro-
ponent has asserted.' A proponent attempts to prove these ultimate
248. By requiring a complaint, the court must again obtain jurisdiction over the
parties before it can proceed with the hearing. This might prove difficult in some
cases. For example, where one who prevailed in the original cause has left the state or
where he was a non-resident and sued in an Indiana court, the applicant who has a valid
cause for relief might be defeated on jurisdictional grounds. Gavit contends that juris-
diction may be obtained by publication in these situations, the action being in rem with
the judgment the res. 2 GAVIT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRAcvicE § 216(c) (1942).
This reasoning is supported in Padol v. Home Bank and Trust Co., 108 Ind. App. 401,
27 N.E.2d 917 (1940). This case allowed notice by publication in an action under Burns
2-1068, but the question was not raised or discussed by the court.
1. "Our procedure and practice do not recognize the right of a defendant to require
the withdrawal of a case from the jury by a motion for a nonsuit." Diamond Block Coal
Co. v. Edmonson, 14 Ind. App. 594, 595, 43 N.E. 242, 243 (1896) ; City of Plymouth v.
Milner, 117 Ind. 324, 20 N.E. 235 (1888). But if the defendant seeks to make an attack
upon the evidence supporting one of several allegations in a complaint, the proper
procedure is to request the court to withdraw that issue from the consideration of the
jury, rather than to request a directed verdict. In New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Verkins,
125 Ind. App. 320, 122 N.E.2d 141 (1954), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was
negligent in three particulars; high and dangerous rate of speed, failure to give a warning,
and failure to keep a lookout. The defendant tendered what appears to be a peremptory
instruction in his favor on the later allegation, but the Appellate court treated the
instruction as one to withdraw the issue from the jury and held that it was error for the
trial court to refuse this motion when there was no evidence to support the issue. See
Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh, 125 Ind. App. 510, 124 N.E.2d 704 (1955). If the paragraphs
of the complaint state different causes of action, the proper motion to attack one
paragraph is the request for a directed verdict. Hamling v. Hildebrandt, 119 Ind. App.
22, 81 N.E.2d 603 (1948) ; Chicago, S.S. & S.B, R.R. Co. v. Pacheco, 94 Ind. App. 353,
181 N.E. 7 (1932).
Evidence is not categorically divided or compartmentalized into the ultimate proposi-
tions that such evidence is adduced to prove. Chacker v. Marcus, 119 Ind. App. 672,
86 N.E.2d 708 (1949). In determining whether the ultimate propostions have been
NOTES
propositions in order to obtain a favorable verdict.2 This verdict must
be reasonable, both in fact and law,3 and the trial judge must exercise
the proper judicial function of preventing unreasonable verdicts.4 Evi-
dence that presents no reasonable factual or inferential basis through
which the truth of each ultimate proposition can be established is legally
insufficient.' Such evidence could only support an unreasonable, judi-
cially preventable, verdict. It must be determined under what state of
the evidence the trial judge may say, as matter of law, that a finding of
these ultimate propositions would be unreasonable. If such a finding
can be made, a requested directed verdict is properly granted.
The trial court judge "should not direct a verdict unless there is a
total lack of evidence on some essential issue."'  A total absence of evi-
dence is ambiguous as a standard for it may be construed by the trial
judge to mean either a literal absence of evidence or a legal absence of
evidence. This ambiguity imposes no serious consequences in terms of
the case result because a finding of either would enable the trial judge
established, it matters not which party introduces the evidence. Fetter v. Powers, 118
Ind. App. 367, 78 N.E.2d 555 (1948). The defendant having unsuccessfully challenged
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's presentation of evidence to support a prima facie case,
may, by proceeding with his own evidence rather than resting, be subjected to the risk of
fulfilling an undetected defect in the plaintiff's case.
2. The term "proponent" is used herein to denote the party bearing the burden
of proof, both as to going forward with evidence and the risk of non-persuasion.
Although the plaintiff will be the proponent in most cases, the possibility of both
burdens resting upon the defendant should not be excluded. For example, the defendant
will be the proponent when an affirmative defense is pleaded. See note 35 infra and
surrounding text.
3. Enmeshed in the question of the propriety of a directed verdict in a given
evidentiary situation is the problem of distinguishing and separating questions of law
from questions of fact. It is established that questions of fact are for the jury, and if
such a question of fact is found to exist, a directed verdict is improper. In the absence
of a question of fact, leaving only questions of law, a directed verdict may or may not
be proper, depending upon the evidentiary situation presented. Kempf v. Himsel, 121
Ind. App. 488, 98 N.E.2d 200 (1951); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 110 Ind. App.
172, 38 N.E.2d 274 (1941). See Thayer, "Law md Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 HAv. L. REV.
147 (1890); Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1923).
4. Both court and jury have struggled for control of the verdict since the inception
of the jury system. Initially the jury held complete control over the verdict, for its
members were selected on the basis of prior knowledge of the incidents which resulted
in the litigation. Court control of the verdict has been manifested in the many devices of
attaint, the fining of jurors, the requirement that facts be found from evidence adduced
in open court, the demurrer to the evidence, the directed verdict, and the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. This evolution is definitively traced in THAYER, A PRE-
LIm INARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE c.C. I-V (1898). A more concise historical survey
may be found in Smith, The Power of a Judge to Direct a Verdict: Section 457-a of
the New York Civil Practice Act, 24 CoLum. L. R.Ev. 111 (1924).
5. Faris v. Hoberg, 134 Ind. 269, 33 N.E. 1028 (1892) ; Thayer, mpra note 3, at 153.
6. Kandea v. Inland Amusement Co., 220 Ind. 219, 224, 41 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1942) ;
Bell v. Bell, 108 Ind. App. 436, 29 N.E.2d 358 (1940) ; Kettner v. Jay, 107 Ind. App.
643, 26 N.E.2d 546 (1939) ; Estes v. Anderson Oil Co., 93 Ind. App. 365, 176 N.E. 560
(1931).
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properly to direct a verdict. However, to find a literal absence of evi-
dence imposes upon the trial judge a duty that differs from that required
in finding a legal absence of evidence. The former would require the
court to make but a summary examination to ascertain whether all of the
ultimate propositions have been covered by the presentation of evidence.
In a case where the law requires that a document be signed by two wit-
nesses, X and Y, and the evidence demonstrates that only Y signed, no
mention being made of X, the proponent must suffer an adverse verdict
due to this quantitative defect in proof. Such a quantitative defect in
proof represents a literal absence of evidence upon the ultimate proposi-
tion. The Indiana courts have not distinguished this situation from a
case in which there is some evidence that both X and Y did sign; but
there remains a question as to the quality of the evidence asserted to
establish that Y did, in fact, sign. When there is a qualitative defect in
the evidence, a verdict is properly directed against the proponent, for any
verdict in favor of the proponent would be insufficient in law. Under
this analysis, language used by the court in asserting that a directed ver-
dict is proper only when there is a total lack of evidence upon some essen-
tial issue loses its restrictive character because a verdict may be directed
both where there is a literal absence of evidence and where there is some
evidence which, although tending to establish the ultimate propositions
in issue, fails to satisfy the qualitative standard.'
The trial court must test the evidence by some qualitative standard
in order to determine if there is such a legal absence of evidence as to
entitle the movant to a directed verdict.' In defining this requisite evi-
dentiary quality, the Indiana courts have engaged in a wide variety of
language which, at best, has left the standard uncertain. The older
scintilla rule required the trial judge to submit the case to the jury if
there was even the slightest quantum of evidence introduced to sustain
7. Although this restrictive language has been used, the Indiana courts appear to
prefer a broader statement of the rule. "It is only where there is a total absence of
evidence upon some essential issue, or where there is no conflict and the evidence is
susceptible of but one interfence and that against the party having the burden, that a
peremptory instruction should be given." Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 223
Ind. 425, 428, 61 N.E.2d 326, 327 (1945); Whitaker v. Borntrager, 233 Ind. 678, 122
N.E.2d 734 (1954) ; Callahan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 125 Ind. App. 631, 125 N.E.2d
263 (1955) ; Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh, 125 Ind. App. 510, 124 N.E.2d 704 (1955) ; Boyd
v. Hodson, 117 Ind. App. 296, 72 N.E.2d 46 (1946).
8. The term "movant" is used herein to indicate the party requesting a direction of
the verdict in his favor. Although the defendant will be the movant in most directed
verdict situations, the possibility that the movant may also be either a plaintiff or a
proponent should not be excluded when considering whether a directed verdict is
proper in a given case.
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the ultimate propositions.9 The rule clearly has been abandoned in In-
diana." However, the term scintilla is still used by the Indiana court in
a negative sense. Such use amounts to a statement of the result that,
after a judicial evaluation of the evidence, there remains a legal absence
of evidence and a verdict is properly directed, but this usage falls far
short of providing a firm qualitative yardstick to be used in measuring
the evidence. Something more than a scintilla of evidence is necessary
to preclude a directed verdict."
The court has utilized a long line of somewhat less than definitive
words as substitutes for the scintilla rule, but their adoption has failed to
establish a clear qualitative standard. The trial judge should not leave
the finding of the ultimate proposition to "speculation, surmise, or con-
jecture,"'" nor is evidence which is "merely the conclusion of a wit-
ness"' 3 sufficient to satisfy the qualitative requirement. In order to
preclude a directed verdict, there must be some competent evidence upon
each material element of the cause of action ; 4 there must be "substantial
evidence . . .it must be evidence which has probative value;" 5 or there
must be a "legitimate inference from the evidence tending to support the
appellant's [plaintiff's] right to recover."' 6  A directed verdict is also
improper when honest jurors might, by reasonable inference from the
evidence adduced, conclude the ultimate proposition,' or when "reason-
able men might differ as to whether plaintiff, by his evidence, has made
a prima fade case."' 8  Such evidence may be weak, for "the weight, con-
vincing nature, extent, and value thereof is for the jury."' Such se-
mantic wandering by the judiciary does little to clarify the evidentiary
standard. But a line somewhere in this list of adjectives divides those
cases in which the trial judge must say that there is a legal absence of
evidence, from those cases in which the minimum "weak" evidence has
9. Company of Carpenters v. Hayward, 1 Doug. 374, 99 Eng. Rep. 241 (K.B. 1780).
In Toomey v. London Ry. Co., 3 C.B. N.S. 146, 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (C.B. 1857), the
scintilla rule was discarded, and was replaced by a requirement that there must be
evidence upon which the jury might reasonably conclude the ultimate propositions.
10. Dunnington v. Syfers, 157 Ind. 458, 62 N.E. 29 (1901).
11. Gewartowski v. Tomal, 125 Ind. App. 481, 123 N.E.2d 580 (1955).
12. Hummel v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 117 Ind. App. 22, 26, 66 N.E.2d 901, 902
(1946) ; Orey v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 215 Ind. 305, 19 N.E.2d 547 (1939).
13. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Verkins, 125 Ind. App. 320, 322, 122 N.E.2d 141,
142 (1954).
14. Diezi v. Hammond Co., 156 Ind. 583, 60 N.E. 353 (1900).
15. Hummel v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 117 Ind. App. 22, 25, 66 N.E.2d 901,
902 (1946).
16. Gasco v. Tracas, 85 Ind. App. 591, 594, 155 N.E. 179, 180 (1926).
17. Tarnowski v. Lake Shore & M.S. R.R. Co., 181 Ind. 202, 104 N.E. 16 (1913).
18. Kostial v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 119 Ind. App. 377, 378, 85 N.E.2d
644, 644 (1949).
19. Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh, 125 Ind. App. 510, 519, 124 N.E.2d 704, 708 (1955).
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been attained. Justice Rutledge drew an analogy between this line and
the one that divides substance from shadow, "impossible to draw by
magic of word or formula, . . . and always relevant to the issues and
the evidence in a particular case."2  The reversal of many directed ver-
dict cases indicates that the Indiana courts have failed to give trial judges
an adequate framework to be used in ruling on the motion.2'
When ruling upon the now outmoded demurrer to the evidence, the
trial judge was constrained to totally disregard evidence which favored
the demurrant. The demurrant was deemed to have admitted the truth
of the proponent's evidence and the reasonable inferences which could
be drawn therefrom.2 Hence there was neither a conflict as to credi-
bility of witnesses nor a contradiction of the evidence favorable to the
proponent that would raise an issue of fact for jury determination. Evi-
dence favorable to the demurrant simply was not considered. The re-
placement of the demurrer to the evidence by the directed verdict as a
weapon of evidentiary attack was caused chiefly by inherent procedural
disadvantages in the demurrer to the evidence." But judicial confusion
has resulted in the motions being treated as equivalents.24 This confu-
sion appears in cases which adopt the rule that when there is a conflict
in the evidence, evidence that favors the movant is deemed to be with-
drawn.25 The deemed to be withdrawn rule was utilized in Hamble v.
20. Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
21. E.g., Whitaker v. Borntrager, 233 Ind. 678, 122 N.E.2d 734 (1954) ; Branden-
burg v. Buchta, 233 Ind. 221, 117 N.E.2d 643 (1953) ; Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh, 125
Ind. App. 510, 124 N.E.2d 704 (1955); Callahan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 125 Ind.
App. 631, 125 N.E.2d 263 (1955) ; Kostial v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 119 Ind. App.
377, 85 N.E.2d 644 (1949).
22. Fritz v. Clark, 80 Ind. 591 (1881).
23. Upon a demurrer to the evidence, the demurrant was constrained to admit in
writing not only the veracity of evidence favorable to the opponent but also all facts
which that evidence tended reasonably to prove. Overruling the demurrer foreclosed
the demurrant's opportunity to present evidence in defense and judgment was rendered
in favor of the opponent. See Smith, supra note 4 at 113. A motion for a directed
verdict, overruled at the close of the proponent's case, does not preclude the movant's
right to proceed with his own evidence, but, by proceeding, the movant waives any error
which the court may have made in ruling upon the motion. Long v. Archer, 221 Ind. 186,
46 N.E.2d 818 (1943).
24. "When a demurrer to the evidence would be sustained, the court may instruct
the jury to find against the plaintiff. . . . The direction of verdicts superseded demurrers
to evidence, and is governed by the same rules." Jacobs v. Jolley, 29 Ind. App. 25, 38, 62
N.E. 1028, 1032 (1901). Further evidence of the confusion of the two motions is found
in Boyd v. Hodson, 117 Ind. App. 296, 72 N.E.2d 46 (1946), wherein the court held that,
on motion for a directed verdict, the movant admitted the truth of all competent evidence
tending to prove the proponent's case and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom.
See Estes v. Anderson Oil Co., 93 Ind. App. 365, 176 N.E. 560 (1931).
25. Kandea v. Inland Amusement Co., 220 Ind. 219, 41 N.E.2d 795 (1942); Bell
v. Bell, 108 Ind. App. 436, 29 N.E.2d 358 (1940); Kettner v. Jay, 107 Ind. App. 643,
26 N.E.2d 546 (1939) ; Estes v. Anderson Oil Co., 93 Ind. App. 365, 176 N.E. 560 (1931).
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Brandt" where the plaintiff sought recovery for the loss of his wife's
services. She sustained injuries as a result of the alleged negligence of
the defendant's servant in allowing a brick to fall upon her from over-
head construction work in which the defendant was engaged. The plain-
tiff, his son, and the physician who treated the wife testified as to the
date of the occurrence of the accident. The plaintiff and his son testi-
fied that it occurred on December 8, while the physician placed the date
as on or about December 8. There was also evidence that the contractor
defendant commenced the work on December 1, and that the work was
completed and the premises vacated by the defendant on December 6.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the
close of all of the evidence. Although this action was affirmed on appeal
on the basis that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable due
to the plaintiff's failure to prove that the instrumentality was in the ex-
clusive control of the defendant, the court also held that the evidence of
the beginning and completion dates of the work "could not be rightfully
considered by the trial court [in determining whether there was evidence
from which the jury might have reasonably concluded that the injury was
caused by the defendant's negligence] because not favorable to appellant
[plaintiff] .'27 Such a "deemed to be withdrawn" rule sounds in de-
murrer to the evidence because the essence of this motion is a voluntary
eradication of conflict. On the other hand, conflict in evidence sounds
in directed verdict, for the movant may or may not desire to admit the
veracity of evidence favorable to the proponent. In addition, and of
more importance, the modern movant wishes evidence favorable to his
cause to do equal duty with that which favors the proponent. But the
"deemed to be wtihdrawn" rule requires the trial judge to determine the
qualitative sufficiency of the proponent's case without regard to the
quality of evidence favorable to the movant. In terms of consequences,
the rule generally leaves the trial judge with only the power of setting
aside an unreasonable verdict and granting a new trial. Litigation is
prolonged, costs are increased, and the judicial power of preventing un-
reasonable verdicts is weakened. Fortunately, this extremely narrow
view of the mission of evidence favorable to the movant has not enjoyed
complete acceptance in the Indiana courts, but in light of the fact that
the cases in which it has been adopted have never been overruled, a word
of caution is provided for the prospective movant.
A plurality of the Indiana cases have digressed from the extreme
view stated above by adopting the rule that the trial judge must consider
26. 98 Ind. App. 399, 189 N.E. 533 (1933).
27. Id. at 403, 189 N.E. at 535.
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only the evidence and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom which
favor the proponent.28 A failure of these cases to mention the "deemed
to be withdrawn" rule leads, by implication, to the conclusion that evi-
dence favorable to the movant is and should be considered in determin-
ing what evidence and inferences can legally favor the proponent. In
Hummel v. New York Central R. Co.,29 an action was brought under the
wrongful death statute against a railroad for injuries sustained through
the negligence of the railroad's servant in failing to blow a warning
whistle when approaching a crossing. The plaintiff called two witnesses.
The first was the engineer who testified that the whistle was blowing
at the crossing and that it had been blowing since the train left Indian-
apolis. The plaintiff's other witness was a woman who had lived very
near the crossing for thirty years. She testified "that she did not hear
the whistle; she never heard the whistle, she had gotten accustomed to
trains and never noticed them; she was accustomed to it and she never
noticed this train whistle; it could have whistled; she did not mean to say
it didn't whistle; it could have whistled because she just didn't notice
them.""0  The trial court, on its own motion, directed a verdict for the
defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case. The Indiana Appellate
court affirmed this decision. As evidence, the witness' statement that
"she did not hear the whistle" was favorable to the plaintiff, and, taken
alone, would support the negative inference that the whistle was not
blown. Her further statement as to why she didn't hear the whistle is
evidence which favors the defendant, and one from which it is reasonably
inferrable that the whistle was blown. But, when all of her testimony is
examined, the drawing of the negative inference favoring the plaintiff
becomes unreasonable, or as the court said, "a finding that the whistle
was not blown could be the result only of speculation, surmise and con-
jecture."'" The decision in the Hummel case would have been an im-
proper one if the court had utilized the "deemed to be withdrawn" rule.
The witness' statement that she did not hear the whistle would have been
considered without regard to the qualifying evidence favorable to the
movant, and as such, could have reasonably supported the inference that
the whistle was not blown.
28. E.g., Whitaker v. Borntrager, 233 Ind. 678, 122 N.E.2d 734 (1954); Orey v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 215 Ind. 305, 19 N.E.2d 547 (1939) ; Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh,
125 Ind. App. 510, 124 N.E.2d 704 (1955); Niegos v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co.,
124 Ind. App. 430, 116 N.E.2d 550 (1953); Holtz v. Elgin, J. & E. R.R. Co., 121 Ind.
App. 175, 98 N.E.2d 245 (1950) ; Kostial v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 119 Ind. App.
377, 85 N.E.2d 644 (1949) ; State e.v rel. Thompson v. City of Greencastle, 111 Ind. App.
640, 40 N.E.2d 388 (1942).
29. 117 Ind. App. 22, 66 N.E.2d 901 (1946).
30. Id. at 25, 66 N.E.2d at 902.
31. Id. at 26, 66 N.E.2d at 902.
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The reasonable inference rule allows trial judges to exert proper
control over the jury and verdict by subjecting all of the evidence to a
test of reasonableness. Utilization of this control may be manifested in
one of two ways. First, the court may subjectively disregard evidence
favorable to the movant and make a temporary assumption of the truth
of evidence favorable to the proponent and reasonable inferences de-
ducible therefrom. Under this assumption, the court must determine
whether this evidence brings the proponent within the protection of the
substantive rule of law relied on to establish either liability or a valid
defense. If the evidence favorable to the proponent fails to bring the
case within the protection of the substantive rule, a verdict should be
directed for the movant, for to allow the jury to return a verdict for the
proponent would be to allow the jury to establish a new substantive rule
of law imposing liability upon the movant. Judicial control over the
rules fixing legal liability would be abolished. In Chacker v. Marcus2
the plaintiff brought an action against his partner and an employed book-
keeper for the alleged misappropriation of restaurant business receipts.
There was evidence that the profits fluctuated between the time that the
defendant partner was in exclusive control of the cash register and the
time when the cash register was in the exclusive control of other partners.
The plaintiff made inquiry of both defendants as to these fluctuations,
and was told: "Don't worry, we are doing business okay. Everything
will be taken care of." There was also undisputed evidence that certain
bookkeeping entries were made by the employee for the purpose of
avoiding payment of taxes. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the
trial court directed a verdict in favor of both defendants. In affirming
this direction, the Indiana Appellate court said: "It seems to us that a
fair consideration of all of the evidence in the light of the appellant's
[plaintiff's] contentions, present a situation in which the appellant [plain-
tiff] asks this court to establish a rule that when one partner is in charge
of a business and the business makes less profit than when other partners
were in exclusive charge of it, that such evidence together with re-
assuring oral reports of the condition of the business . . ., would be
sufficient to justify a reasonable inference that such partner is guilty of
misappropriation of funds. As a matter of law, it cannot be said that
embezzlement or misappropriation of funds can be established from a
mere showing of a fluctuation of profits alone . . .""
This "preliminary assumption of truth" test is equally applicable in
negligence cases where the issue is whether the defendant has complied
32. 119 Ind. App. 672, 86 N.E.2d 708 (1949).
33. Id. at 677, 86 N.E.2d at 710.
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with the standard of care. "When, during the trial, the court is called
upon to instruct the jury, there is . . . but one limitation upon the duty
to charge that a given state of facts, if found by the jury to exist, does
or does not authorize the finding of negligence, and that exception is
where the facts, clearly established, are such that one man, impartial and
of good judgment, might reasonably infer that negligence existed, while
another man, equally sensible and impartial, might reasonably infer that
proper care had been used. Upon such facts it is the province of the
jury to adjudge the existence or nonexistence of negligence."" Although
the trial judge's statutory power to grant a new trial is an effective de-
vice for the prevention of substantive change by means of a jury verdict,
the power does not afford adequate protection to the movant because
such a movant is forced to suffer the time and expense of a new trial in
order to establish his freedom from liability.
By making this preliminary assumption of truth, the court subjec-
tively eradicates from its consideration all evidence favorable to the mov-
ant, forcing the movant to admit facts and inferences reasonably de-
ducible therefrom that evidence favorable to the proponent tends to
prove. As a result, there can be no factual conflict requiring jury recon-
ciliation. Credibility of witnesses is not in issue. The application of the
test in the usual case in which the movant does not bear the burden of
any issue will not operate adversely to either party's interest in having
conflicts and credibility passed upon by the jury. To direct a verdict in
favor of the movant neither coerces a disbelief of oral testimony favor-
able to the proponent nor demands that conflict be reconciled favorable
to the movant. The jury may believe or disbelieve as it sees fit and may
resolve any conflict for one party or the other, but a quantitative or
qualitative defect may still exist in the proponent's case. But the "pre-
liminary assumption of truth" test must not be applied in cases in which
the same party is both the movant and the proponent. A verdict may
never be properly directed in favor of such a "proponent-movant" where
the determination of the question depends upon conflicting testimony or
the credibility of witnesses35 for such a direction would demand that
34. Faris v. Hoberg, 134 Ind. 269, 272, 33 N.E. 1028, 1028 (1892). "The court de-
termines, first, whether if the facts are true, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. While
this judicial function is generally invoked in passing upon the sufficiency of pleadings,
it often arises again upon the evidence, and where the evidence most favorable to the
plaintiff is insufficient to establish negligence in law, the court should dispose of the
matter and not permit the question to go to the jury." New York Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Powell, 221 Ind. 321, 331, 47 N.E.2d 615, 619 (1943). See HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS
c. 15 (1956) ; GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE c. 4 § 2 (1927).
35. This rule applies to both the direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
as to the issue of the defendant's negligence and to the direction of a verdict in favor
of the defendant as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Heiny v. Pennsylvania
246
NOTES
material conflicts be reconciled in favor of the proponent or would co-
erce a belief of oral testimony favorable to the proponent."
Although the "deemed to be withdrawn" rule has not enjoyed ap-
preciable favor in the Indiana courts, it appears to have properly re-
mained to fulfill a necessary function in the first reasonableness test
under the rule that permits the court to consider only evidence and in-
ferences reasonably deducible therefrom which favor the proponent.
Even if the evidence in a case is undisputed, different inferences may or
may not flow therefrom. If there are conflicting inferences, a prelimi-
nary judicial control in terms of the reasonableness of these conflicting
inferences must be exercised if the jury is to be confined within accept-
able limits of legal liability.3" This "undisputed evidence-controlled in-
ference" theory has been the basis of a proper directed verdict in negli-
gence actions in which the court has held that the movant's conduct was
not the proximate cause of the proponent's injuries ;" that the movant
R.R. Co., 221 Ind. 367, 47 N.E.2d 145 (1942). This rule was erroneously stated in
State v. Robbins, 221 Ind. 125, 46 N.E.2d 691 (1943), where the trial court directed a
verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of the state's case. In reversing this
decision, the Indiana Supreme court said: "Whether the state had proven its case, after
this testimony was in, depended upon whether the jury would give credence to the testi-
mony. Where a determination of the issue involves the credibility of witnesses, it is an
invasion of the province of the jury for the court to direct a verdict." Id. at 135, 46
N.E.2d at 694. This statement of the rule is accurate if its scope is limited to the
proponent. As stated, the rule is erroneous for a defect in proof may be found whether
the jury believes or disbelieves the testimony in question. For an excellent analysis of the
various approaches that have been taken to the rule which prohibits the direction of a
verdict in favor of the proponent see Sunderland, Directing a Verdict for the Party
Having the Burden of Proof, 11 Mica. L. Ray. 198 (1912).
36. Such a forced reconciliation of conflict or coercion of belief is not present when
the evidence is documentary in nature. The reason for the rule therefore disappears, and
it is permissable to direct a verdict in favor of the proponent in such cases. Modern
Woodmen of America v. Jones, 52 Ind. App. 149, 98 N.E. 1006 (1912) ; Fowler Utilities
Co. v. Chaffin Coal Co., 43 Ind. App. 438, 87 N.E. 689 (1908).
37. "Where there is no dispute as to the facts, and no controversy as to the infer-
ences that can be legitimately drawn from them, the question is one of law, and the court
may rightfully take the case from the jury." Purcell v. English, 86 Ind. 34, 35 (1882).
38. In Slinkard v. Babb, 125 Ind. App. 76, 112 N.E.2d 876 (1954), the facts were
undisputed. The court held, as a matter of law, that the only reasonable inference
deducible from the facts was that the chain of causation had been broken by an inter-
vening force which could not have been anticipated. The trial court directed verdict
was affirmed on that basis. A motion to transfer to the Indiana Supreme court was
denied without opinion. Slinkard v. Babb, 233 Ind. 633, 122 N.E.2d 463 (1954). Judge
Emmert, writing a dissenting opinion on the motion to transfer, would have reversed
the trial court's direction of the verdict in favor of the defendant on the grounds that,
as proximate cause is to be based upon foreseeability, it was for the jury to say whether
the intervening force was foreseeable. If such a force was foreseeable the defendant's
conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Support for Judge Emmert's
position is found in McIntosh v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 111 Ind. App. 550, 38 N.E.2d
263 (1941), where the court, dealing with undisputed facts, reversed a trial court directed
verdict in favor of the defendant. "We think that under proper instructions the jury
was entitled under all of the evidence to reach its own conclusion as to whether or not
it might reasonably be anticipated and foreseen that such a collision . . . might
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owed the proponent no duty of care;3" or where the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as matter of law.4" The approach has also been
used by the court to prevent recovery in actions of agency,4 conver-
sion,42 landlord-tenant,4" contract,4 4 and malicious prosecution"
A verdict may be properly directed for the movant by application
of the first reasonableness test alone in two situations: first, conceding
that there is a conflict in the evidence, when that evidence favorable to
the proponent fails to bring his case within the protection of the rule of
law asserted; and, secondly, when there is no conflict in the evidence and
there can be no reasonable inference drawn therefrom which will bring
the proponent within the protection of the rule of law asserted.
But when the proponent has, by evidence or inference therefrom,
successfully brought his case within the protection of the rule of law
under the first reasonableness test, the court must apply a second test of
reasonableness to the evidence. Here the court must vitiate the assump-
tion of truth and, in light of all the evidence, must determine what quan-
tum and quality of evidence reasonably remains to support the ultimate
propositions which the proponent has asserted. As in the Humnnel case,
evidence favorable to the movant must be considered in order that the
court may make an accurate qualitative appraisal of the evidence in terms
of reasonableness. By subjecting all of the evidence to this dual-reason-
ableness test, the court is merely exercising the well-recognized power of
deciding whether or not the ultimate propositions can be inferred by the
occur . . ., and whether or not it might reasonably be anticipated and foreseen that if
such collision did occur that flying parts of the demolished automobile might do injury
to the travelling public as a class .... ." Id. at 562, 38 N.E.2d at 267. See Phares v.
Carr, 122 Ind. App. 597, 106 N.E.2d 242 (1952); Holtz v. Elgin, J. & E. R.R. Co., 121
Ind. App. 175, 98 N.E.2d 245 (1950); Smith v. Feerer, 117 Ind. App. 304, 70 N.E.2d
770 (1946).
39. Faris v. Hoberg, 134 Ind. 269, 33 N.E. 1028 (1892) ; Niegos v. Indiana Harbor
Belt R.R. Co., 124 Ind. App. 430, 116 N.E.2d 550 (1954).
40. These cases require a direction in favor of the proponent-movant, for the
defendant bears the burden of the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Such
a direction has been held proper only in cases in which the plaintiff's presentation of
evidence demonstrates his own negligence. The theory is apparently that it would be
unreasonable to disbelieve the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses. Pittsburgh,
C., C., & St. L. R.R .Co. v. Sievers, 162 Ind. 234, 70 N.E. 133 (1903) ; Day v. Cleveland,
C., C., & St. L. R.R. Co., 137 Ind. 206, 36 N.E. 854 (1893). These cases would be improper
under a "deemed to be withdrawn" rule for such testimony offered by the plaintiff
would favor the proponent-movant and would have to be disregarded in ruling on the
motion for a directed verdict.
41. Wagner v. Howard Sober, Inc., 119 Ind. App. 617, 86 N.E.2d 719 (1949);
Cates v. Long, 117 Ind. App. 444, 72 N.E.2d 233 (1946).
42. Chacker v. Marcus, 119 Ind. App. 672, 86 N.E.2d 708 (1949).
43. Purcell v. English, 86 Ind. 34 (1882).
44. Taylor v. Altgelt, 224 Ind. 383, 67 N.E.2d 531 (1946) ; Fowler Utilities Co. v.
Chaffin Coal Co., 43 Ind. App. 438, 87 N.E. 689 (1908).
45. Boyd v. Hodson, 117 Ind. App. 296, 72 N.E.2d 46 (1946).
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jury. An affirmative finding upon both phases of the test raises a ques-
tion for the jury as to whether or not the ultimate propositions should
be inferred.4
The Indiana courts quite properly have made it clear that weighing
the evidence prior to a verdict is a jury function." Inquiry should be
made to determine whether the second phase of the dual-reasonableness
test improperly grants this pre-verdict weighing power to the trial judge.
A trial judge may set aside a verdict on a motion for a new trial if the
verdict, in his opinion, is against the weight of the evidence for such a
verdict is either not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to
law.4" Therefore, the new trial motion requires the trial judge to weigh
the evidence in terms of its probative value and as to which party the
evidence preponderates. But in ruling on the motion for a directed ver-
dict the judicial consideration is focused upon a decision as to what evi-
dence reasonably remains favorable to the proponent which may be placed
in the scales of preponderance of which the jury is the weighmaster.
A verdict is not properly directed when, in the opinion of the court, evi-
dence favorable to the movant probatively outweighs that evidence which
is favorable to the proponent. 9 Yet, if the jury returns a verdict favor-
able to the proponent, the court may set it aside by granting a motion for
a new trial." This power to weigh the evidence upon a motion for a new
trial presents an apparent paradox, for the trial judge is seemingly em-
powered to set aside a verdict that he cannot prevent. In most cases, up-
46. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Powell, 221 Ind. 321, 47 N.E.2d 615 (1943).
47. "If a trial court is permitted to weigh the evidence and direct the action of
the jury, w'hen there is conflict in the evidence or conflicting inferences can reasonably
be drawn therefrom, the right of trial by jury, which is protected by the Bill of Rights
in both our Federal and State Constitutions, will be violated." Moslander v. Moslander's
Estate, 110 Ind. App. 122, 127, 38 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1941) ; Phares v. Carr, 122 Ind. App.
597, 106 N.E.2d 242 (1952). For an excellent discussion of the duties of both the
trial judge and jury in relation to weighing the evidence, the former both before and
after the verdict and the later at the pre-verdict stage of the trial, see State ex -el.
Winslow v. Fisher, 109 Ind. App. 644, 37 N.E.2d 280 (1941).
48. Wilson v. Rollings, 214 Ind. 155, 14 N.E.2d 905 (1937).
49. IHaughton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 165 Ind. 32, 73 N.E. 592 (1905).
50. An early statement of the rule appears to grant this weighing power to the trialjudge. "A judge should not submit a question to the jury where their verdict, if
contrary to his views of the evidence and its legal effect, would be set aside, as against
the law and the evidence." Williams v. Resener, 25 Ind. App. 132, 133, 56 N.E. 857,
858 (1900). This statement of the rule resulted from judicial omission of a significant
qualification which now appears in the accepted statement of the rule that: "If the
evidence for the defense satisfied the court that appellant [plaintiff] ought not to recover
and that a verdict for appellant ought to be set aside as being contrary to the weight
of the evidence, it was not the court's province to instruct the jury to return a verdict
for appellee [defendant]. It is only when the plaintiff fails to make a case, so that it
would be the duty of the trial court or of a higher court on appeal to set aside the verdict
as not being supported by any competent evidence on some material point, that a verdict
for the defendant should be directed." Diezi v. Hammond Co., 156 Ind. 583, 588, 60
N.E. 353, 355 (1900).
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on a motion for a directed verdict, the weight properly assignable to evi-
dence will be a question of fact. Weight implies conflict, the reconcilia-
tion of which is a factual decision for the jury. But there may also be
evidentiary situations in which, on motion for a directed verdict, weight
of the evidence can become a question of law. The weight of evidence
may only become a question of law on a motion for a directed verdict at
that point where the qualitative value of evidence favorable to the mov-
ant conclusively eradicates evidence which would favor the proponent
under the "deemed to be withdrawn" rule. A jury verdict favorable to
the proponent would be unreasonable in this situation because it would
have to be based upon speculation, surmise, conjecture, or any other
qualitative description that amounts to a legal absence of evidence.
Hence, in this narrow area of clear unreasonableness, the court should
properly direct a verdict for the movant. A basic policy of the adversary
system for the settlement of disputes is found in the power of the jury
to decide questions of fact by weighing the evidence. However, this
policy should not be allowed to obscure the necessary judicial function
of preventing unreasonableness in fact and law. If a proper balance of
these powers is to be maintained between court and jury, the court must
always weigh the evidence upon a motion for a directed verdict in the
limited sense of preventing clear unreasonableness." It is in this sense
that the paradox is but an apparent one. 2
In the recent case of Whitaker v. Borntrager," the plaintiff, as ad-
ministrator of the estate of the decedent, brought an action under the
wrongful death statute. The decedent was killed as a result of being hit
51. In the Hummel case the court said that it could not properly weigh conflicting
portions of the testimony of the same witness. "Yet while we will not weigh it, the
evidence that will support a finding must be substantial evidence. It must be evidence
which has probative value." 117 Ind. App. at 25, 66 N.E.2d at 902. Whether or not
the function be called "weighing the evidence," the court has accomplished the result of
determining the qualitative sufficiency of the evidence. Probative value and substantial
evidence appear to be equated with reasonableness or reasonable doubt; speculation, sur-
mise or conjecture appear to be equated with an unreasonableness in finding the ultimate
propositions. It is such an unreasonableness that the court may prevent.
52. The paradox becomes real only when the court exercises its discretionary power
in setting aside a verdict. If it could be said that a trial judge would set aside a verdict
which has an evidentiary foundation in either reason or reasonable doubt, the paradox
would also be a real one. However, such an occurrence does not seem likely.
This interpretation of the Indiana cases demonstrates a substantial agreement with
the New York statute that governs the direction of a verdict. "The court may direct
a verdict when it would be required to set aside a contrary verdict for legal insufficiency
of evidence." N.Y. CiV. PRAC. AcT § 457-a. The only significant difference is that, in
determining whether there is a legal insufficiency of evidence, the New York courts
subject evidence favorable to the movant to the "deemed to be withdrawn" rule.
Fifteenth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of the State of New York 245, 250
(1949) ; Rothschild, Summary Judical Power, 19 CORNELL L. Q. 361 (1934) ; Smith,
supra note 4; Note, 22 COLUm. L. REV. 256 (1922).
53. 233 Ind. 678, 122 N.E.2d 734 (1954).
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by the defendant who was operating a truck, after dark, in a northerly
direction along a highway. The defendant did not see the decedent until
seconds before the accident, and there was damage to the grill and radia-
tor in the center of the front of the truck. At the time the body was hit,
a tractor travelling south on the same highway passed the defendant.
The question with which both the trial and appellate courts were faced
was the determination of the exact location of the decedent immediately
prior to the collision. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the trial
court sustained the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, apparently
on the basis that, since the defendant did not see the decedent until
seconds prior to the collision, the only inference that could reasonably be
drawn was that the decedent jumped from the rear of the passing tractor
onto the hood of the truck, and that therefore the defendant was not
negligent. "4  This ruling was reversed on appeal. The basis of the re-
versal was that it might reasonably be inferred from the physical condi-
tions surrounding the collision that the death was caused by the de-
fendant's negligence. There being more than one inference reasonably
deducible from the evidence, the verdict was improperly directed.
The court, perhaps, realized the need for clarification of the directed
verdict in Indiana, for its discussion of the merits of the case was pref-
aced by this hypothetical question: "When may a trial court properly
give the trial jury a peremptory instruction to find [direct a verdict] for
the defendant?" After stating the "total absence of evidence or legiti-
mate inference" rule discussed above, the court established by strong
dicta that a verdict may also be directed for the defendant "where the
evidence is without conflict and is susceptible of but one inference and
that inference is in favor of the defendant." "  These standards have
been accepted as "the fundamental and well-established rules and prin-
ciples for the guidance of trial courts in determining upon a motion for
a directed verdict.""'
Because oral testimony will be required to establish the ultimate
propositions in nearly every case, the "without conflict" standard neces-
sitates an examination of the Indiana courts' treatment of oral testimony
upon a motion for a directed verdict. As a general rule, the credibility
of a witness is a factual question to be decided by the jury, for the right
54. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 17, 18; Brief for Appellee, pp. 10, 11, Whitaker v.
Borntrager, 233 Ind. 678, 122 N.E.2d 734 (1954).
55. 233 Ind. at 680, 122 N.E.2d at 734.
56. Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh, 125 Ind. App. 510, 513, 124 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1955);
Callahan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 125 Ind. App. 631, 125 N.E.2d 263 (1955).
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to believe or disbelieve presents a conflict which the jury must reconcile."
But there must be a limitation upon this power to believe or disbelieve,
for if the power was without limit, credibility would always be in issue
and a directed verdict would never be proper. The fact that there is a
limitation upon the power indicates that, when the court uses the term
credibility, it states a legal conclusion that the power to believe or dis-
believe rests with the jury in the particular case.
Application of preliminary judicial controls to the testimony will
determine whether an issue of credibility has been raised. A witness
should not be disbelieved because of mere caprice or without cause,58 and
if the court can say, as a matter of law, that the testimony of a witness
is contrary to scientific principles, the law of nature, or the physical
facts,59 no factual issue of credibility is raised for jury determination.
These controls stem, once again, from the concept of reasonableness for
a verdict based on such testimony would require arbitrary rather than
reasonable jury conduct. Due cause for jury disbelief of oral testimony
may be found in one of several considerations which are guides for jury
evaluation of the witness and his testimony. These considerations are
the interest of the witness in the outcome of the litigation, his bias and
prejudice, if any, the probability or improbability of his testimony, and
his demeanor on the witness stand.6" The court has erroneously pre-
empted the jury of these functions of determining credibility in several
57. Cates v. Long, 117 Ind. App. 444, 72 N.E.2d 233 (1946). "It is the right of the
jury to weigh the evidence, and, in so doing, to reconcile conflict, if possible, and, if not
possible, to reject that which is unworthy of belief. . . . The court was not authorized
to weigh conflicting evidence, even where there was but one witness, and even though the
conflict appeared between the evidence given on direct and cross-examination." Tar-
nowski v. Lake Shore & M.S. R.R. Co., 181 Ind. 202, 209, 104 N.E. 16, 18 (1913).
However, a motion by each party that a verdict be directed in his favor has the effect of
an admission that there is no conflict in the testimony and a request that the facts be
determined by the trial court. Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Vaughn, 65 Ind.
App. 581, 117 N.E. 673 (1917).
58. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. Co. v. Turpin, 82 Ind. App. 78, 145 N.E. 316 (1924).
59. Neuwelt v. Roush, 119 Ind. App. 481, 85 N.E.2d 506 (1949) ; Connor v. Jones,
115 Ind. App. 660, 59 N.E.2d 577 (1944). But, in Kostial v. Aero Mayflower Transit
Co., 119 Ind. App. 377, 85 N.E.2d 644 (1949), the trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. The Appellate court reversed this
ruling. The majority, on appeal, found that, "while there is some contradiction in the
testimony of the only eye witness as to whether decedent was standing on the paved road
or just off of it at the time of the accident, the jury had the right to determine this
matter." Id. at 380, 85 N.E.2d at 645. The dissenting opinion found that the decedent
had to be standing on the paved portion of the road, for if he had been standing off the
road, the physical fact of damage to the nearby automobile could not have occurred.
The dissent would have affirmed the trial judge's direction of the verdict since these
physical facts made the decedent contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 381,
85 N.E.2d at 645. See State v. Robbins, 221 Ind. 125, 46 N.E.2d 691 (1943), for another
example of trial and appellate court difference of opinion as to factual possibility.
60. Pohlman v. Perry, 122 Ind. App. 222, 103 N.E.2d 911 (1951); Sevald v.
Chicago & Calumet Dist. Transit Co., 119 Ind. App. 33, 82 N.E.2d 270 (1948).
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cases6 by accepting uncontradicted testimony favorable to the movant as
true and affirming the direction of the verdict on that basis.
Frick v. Bicke62 was a case brought by the plaintiff against the
owner of a vehicle to recover for injuries sustained as a result of the ad-
mitted negligence of the driver of the vehicle. The plaintiff established
in evidence that the defendant was the owner of the vehicle, that the
driver was in the general employ of the defendant, and that the accident
occurred shortly after 5:00 in the afternoon as the driver proceeded to
his home. Employees testified that the defendant's vehicles were not to
be driven to and from work without obtaining, on each occasion, the ex-
press permission of the defendant. One employee testified that shortly
before 5:00 on the day in question, the negligent driver had come to the
office seeking the defendant in order to obtain permission to drive the
vehicle to his home. The defendant was not there, and the driver was
unable to locate him by telephone, whereupon the driver proceeded with
th vehicle. The accident happened shortly thereafter. At the close of
all the evidence, the trial court overruled the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The
defendant appealed from the overruling of his motion for a new trial.
The Indiana Appellate court held that the requested directed verdict
should have been granted. The theory of the reversal is simple, but its
application to the facts is erroneous. The court held that "evidence of
ownership coupled with proof of general employment and the presump-
tion that arises therefrom [that the driver was within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident] makes a prima fade case suf-
ficient to go to the jury.""3 This is sound. The court continued: "The
jury cannot arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the undisputed testimony
of credible witnesses introduced to obviate the effect of the presump-
tion." This is unsound in two respects. First, the court assumes the
truth of witnesses whom the court has never seen. It does not seem logi-
cal that truth can so clearly appear upon a bare record, especially when
the trial judge has denied both the motion for a directed verdict and the
motion for a new trial." Secondly, the court totally disregards the sig-
nificant fact that the rebutting evidence came from the mouths of in-
terested witnesses and in a situation where the facts were peculiarly
61. Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1952) ; Robinson v. Ferguson,
107 Ind. App. 107, 22 N.E.2d 901 (1939).
62. 115 Ind. App. 114, 54 N.E.2d 436 (1944).
63. Id. at 120, 54 N.E.2d at 438.
64. American Ins. Co. v. Paggett, 73 Ind. App. 677, 128 N.E. 468 (1920).
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within the knowledge of the defendant.65 By treating the presumption
as having "vanished or become inoperative6 in the face of clear, credible
and undisputed evidence in rebuttal thereof,""7 the court has coerced a
belief of evidence favorable to the movant thereby usurping the jury
function of deciding credibility.8
Although the court does not explain their reason for coercing belief
in the Frick case, the holding is apparently based upon the theory that a
failure to contradict testimony amounts to a tacit admission of its ver-
acity. 9 If this argument is sound, it should be restricted to those cases
in which it would be reasonable to expect the proponent to have at least
some access to evidence with which to make the contradiction. The rule
has not been applied to all cases and the better theory is that even though
testimony is not contradicted, an issue of credibility should be raised so
that the jury may apply the considerations of interest, bias, candor and
probability." The credibility of oral testimony is but one facet of the
65. The facts in Brandenburg v. Buchta, 233 Ind. 221, 117 N.E.2d 643 (1953),
were very similar to those in Frick v. Bickel, 115 Ind. App. 114, 54 N.E.2d 436 (1944),
but the motion for a directed verdict was made by the defendant at the close of the
plaintiff's case in chief. The granting of this motion was reversed on appeal. The
court held that since the facts were peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant,
he should be required to go forward with proof that the vehicle was being operated
without his authority. If such proof had been adduced, it may be speculated that the
court would have followed the Frick case in allowing a directed verdict on the erroneous
ground of the vanished inference. See Pohlman v. Perry, 122 Ind. App. 222, 103 N.E.2d
911 (1951).
66. This erroneous theory has also been applied where the plaintiff, having no
access to the facts, seeks to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in order to establish
a prima facie case. "It will be noted that the doctrine res ipsa loquitur does not prevail
where the party against whom it might apply accepts the duty of going on with the
proof and details the entire transaction. In such a situation the presumption, inference or
doctrine ceases to exist and all questions concerning the injury must be determined from
the evidence unaided by the inference or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Worster v.
Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 632, 110 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1952); Robinson v. Ferguson, 107 Ind.
App. 107, 22 N.E.2d 901 (1939). See Kaiser v. Happel, 219 Ind. 28, 36 N.E.2d 784
(1941), holding that the presumption of the sanity of a testator is not evidence.
A different approach was voiced by the court in Magazine v. Shull, 116 Ind. App. 79,
60 N.E.2d 611 (1945), in holding that a reasonable and legitimate inference was competent
evidence. If the inference is competent evidence, it creates a conflict in the evidence
and the case must go to the jury. But, even if the inference is not evidence, as such, it
seems unreasonable to allow uncontradicted testimony to destroy its reasonableness in
situations such as was presented in the Frick case. For a discussion lending support to
the Indiana court's treatment of a presumption or inference in these cases see Note, 31
CALIF. L. REv. 108 (1942).
67. 115 Ind. App. at 122, 54 N.E.2d at 439.
68. See O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 A. 486 (1934).
69. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. Co. v. Turpin, 82 Ind. App. 78, 145 N.E. 316 (1924).
70. Pohlman v. Perry, 122 Ind. App. 222, 103 N.E.2d 911 (1951) ; Sevald v. Chicago
& Calumet Dist. Transit Co., 119 Ind. App. 33, 82 N.E.2d 270 (1948) ; Goldberg v.
Britton, 119 Ind. App. 90, 84 N.E.2d 201 (1948) ; Neuwelt v. Roush, 119 Ind. App. 481,
85 N.E.2d 506 (1949). See Note, 37 DIcK. L. REv. 213 (1933), for a discussion of the
problem of the power of the court to direct a verdict on undisputed, uncontradicted oral
testimony.
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broader problem of weighing the evidence that confronts both court and
jury. It has been posited above that the court does, in a sense, weigh the
evidence. It is in this same sense that the court should perform the func-
tion of evaluating oral testimony. Certainly the rules as to testimony
contrary to the laws of science and nature should be judicially applied
upon a motion for a directed verdict.71  Unreasonableness found under
the second phase of the dual-reasonableness test should also warrant a
proper directed verdict but the application of the test should be tem-
pered by the traditional jury considerations.
It seems necessary to conclude that immediate clarification of the
motion for a directed verdict in Indiana is mandatory. The attempted
clarification in the Whitaker case is creditable. But the standards adopted
there demand further classification and explanation in terms of their
application to the various burden of proof situations with which trial
judges are constantly confronted. By adopting the "total absence of evi-
dence or legitimate inferences" and "evidence is without conflict" tests,
the Indiana Supreme court assumed that trial judges already had an ade-
quate pattern to follow in subjecting the evidence to the crucial qualita-
tive and quantitative tests which the motion for a directed verdict de-
mands. Both the close restraint upon the trial court power to weigh the
evidence, which includes the concepts of conflict and credibility, and
earlier cases which adopt the "deemed to be withdrawn" rule have re-
sulted in confusion as to the proper role which evidence favorable to the
movant is to play in ruling upon the motion. Still, reasonableness and
the prevention of unreasonableness appear to be the common denomina-
tor which the appellate courts desire the trial judge to utilize in ruling on
the motion and which has been and will continue to be utilized upon ap-
pellate review. The very subjective nature, not only of the concept of
reasonableness but also of evidence, inferences and the applicable law it-
self, indicates that there will always be disagreement between trial and
appellate tribunals as to the propriety of a directed verdict in a given evi-
dentiary situation. However, this high degree of subjectivity should not
restrain the upper court from giving trial judges a clear procedural man-
date to guide them in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. This
mandate is the key to a much higher percentage of correct trial court
rulings upon the motion for a directed verdict.
The erroneous grant or refusal of a directed verdict in Indiana trial
71. The court has also indicated that a directed verdict would be proper if evidence
favorable to the proponent demonstrates a situation contrary to ordinary human experi-
ence. Kandea v. Inland Amusement Co., 220 Ind. 219, 41 N.E.2d 795 (1942).
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courts, a frequent cause of reversal by appellate tribunals,"2 generally
may only be remedied in the trial court by the grant of the motion for a
new trial and in the appellate courts by remand for a new trial." Con-
sequently, litigants are directly penalized by expense and delay.74 The
prevention of the error that causes the penalty is of primary importance
and the only preventative remedy will be the enunciation of a comprehen-
sive, unequivocal standard. Only after the adoption of such a standard
will trial judges be able to confidently determine whether a directed ver-
dict is proper in the given evidentiary situation.
The correction of trial court error is of secondary importance. Still
it seems desirable to adopt a procedure whereby, if the trial court errs in
ruling on the motion, that court or an appellate court would have the
power to set aside an erroneous jury verdict and enter judgment for the
party entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This result could be accomplished by the adoption of Federal Rule
50"5 which was recommended by the Judicial Council of Indiana in
1948."8 But such action would not solve the problem of an inadequately
enunciated standard for a directed verdict, for under the federal practice
there exists a similar need for a device by which to determine whether a
given evidentiary situation presents a question of fact for the jury or a
question of law for the court. Federal Rule 50 would benefit Indiana
litigants only to the extent that, when the trial court erroneously refuses
to grant a directed verdict, the entry of a correct judgment could be
made either upon motion at the post-verdict stage in the trial court or at
72. E.g., Whitaker v. Borntrager, 233 Ind. 678, 122 N.E.2d 734 (1954) ; Branden-
burg v. Buchta, 233 Ind. 221, 117 N.E.2d 643 (1953) ; Johnson v. Estate of Gaugh, 125
Ind. App. 510, 124 N.E.2d 704 (1955); Callahan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 125 Ind.
App. 631, 125 N.E.2d 263 (1955) ; Kostial v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 119 Ind. App.
377, 85 N.E.2d 644 (1949).
73. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2501 (1946) provides: "When a trial by jury has been
had, and a general verdict rendered, the judgment must be in conformity to the verdict."
Where, however, a case is tried to the court, and all of the evidence is by admissions in
the pleadings or by stipulation, the appellate tribunal can remand with an order that the
trial court enter the proper judgement. Goldberg v. Britton, 119 Ind. App. 90, 84 N.E.2d
201 (1948) ; Conwell Bank v. Kessler, 94 Ind. App. 256, 180 N.E. 625 (1931). A case
is also considered to have been tried to the court when both parties have moved for a
directed verdict. Continental Casualty Co. v. Klinge, 82 Ind. App. 277, 144 N.E. 246
(1924).
74. See Scott, The Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1918);
Thayer, Judicial Administration, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (1915).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
76. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF INDIANA (1948). This recommendation
was submitted to the Governor, the Supreme Court and the General Assembly of Indiana,
but correspondence with the then members of the Council has failed to uncover either the
juncture at which this recommendation was overruled or the policy considerations
which affected that action.
NOTES
the appellate level." Only a very few cases involving a trial court failure
to direct a verdict have reached the Indiana appellate courts." Such a
rule would, however, foreclose the plaintiff's right to take a voluntary
dismissal when the initial motion for a directed verdict is made." The
interests favored by the federal practice seem to outweigh those bene-
fited under present Indiana practice. But before any move toward adop-
tion is made, it seems desirable to re-examine the primary problem of a
clear directed verdict standard. Clarification of this standard followed
by an adoption of the federal practice appear to be presently needed
steps forward in the prevention of unreasonableness.
77. But appellate correction of a trial court error in erroneously refusing to direct
a verdict in favor of the defendant effectuates nearly the same result as does the entry
of proper judgment in the federal practice. In Wait v. Westfall, 161 Ind. 648, 68 N.E.
271 (1903), the Indiana Supreme court corrected such a trial court error by remanding
for a new trial. On re-trial, the plaintiff introduced substantially the same evidence
as before and the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff
appealed. The trial court direction was affirmed on the basis.of res judicata. Westfall
v. Wait, 165 Ind. 353, 73 N.E. 1089 (1905). Therefore, if the appellate tribunal remands
on the basis of trial court error in refusing to direct in favor of the defendant, unless
the plaintiff can procure new evidence, the parties may consider the litigation effectively
ended. However, the new trial order still subjects the defendant to the risk that the
plaintiff will succumb to the temptation of educating his witnesses so that the evidence
on re-trial may satisfy the qualitative defect found in the initial trial of the case. One
certain consequence of our seemingly anti-defendant policy is that the plaintiff is placed
in a superior bargaining position for out of court settlement prior to re-trial.
Some states have been able to mitigate the harsh consequences of the new trial
requirement by extending the traditional common law plaintiff's motion of judgment
non obstante veredicto to the defendant, enabling the defendant to make a post-verdict
evidentiary attack upon the plaintiff's case prior to an appeal. Carlin, udginent Non
Obstante Veredicto, 51 W. VA. L. Q. 14 (1948) ; Note, 34 MIcH. L. REv. 93 (1935).
78. Pittsburgh, C., C., & St. L. R.R. Co. v. Sievers, 162 Ind. 234, 67 N.E. 680
(1903) ; New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Verkins, 125 Ind. App. 320, 122 N.E.2d 141 (1954) ;
Tribune-Star Pub. Co. v. Fortwendle, 124 Ind. App. 618, 115 N.E.2d 215 (1954) ; Cates
v. Long, 117 Ind. App. 444, 72 N.E.2d 233 (1946). Any estimate of the number of
unreported trial cases in which the federal practice would speed litigation would be
highly speculative, but adoption would serve the useful function of allowing the trial
judge to reflect upon the evidence after receiving the jury verdict. The time interval
would allow the trial judge to more accurately appraise the evidence, so that on the
subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, more correct rulings would
be forthcoming from the trial courts.
79. "An action may be dismissed without prejudice-First. By the plaintiff, before
the jury retires; or, when the trial is by the court, at any time before the finding of the
court is announced .. " IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-901 (1946). This statute has been liberally
construed for the benefit of the plaintiff even to the extent that, "where a trial court
has stated what he was going to do, with respect to what the finding would be, but has
not as a matter of fact announced the finding," the plaintiff may avail himself of the
statute and dismiss without prejudice. Eason v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 124
Ind. App. 53, 59, 114 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1953); Van Sant v. Wentworth, 60 Ind. App.
591, 108 N.E. 975 (1915).
